Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-Local Relations During the Reform Era
How has the Chinese central government been able to avoid the crippling hyperinflation that has bedeviled so many developing and centrally planned economies? China's unique, de facto federalism, Huang argues - a combination of economic and fiscal decentralization and strong political centralization - has spurred economic growth and allowed political institutions to impose restraints on inflation from the top down. Focusing on central-local relations and the controlling role of political institutions, Yasheng Huang explains why local Chinese officials comply, even against their own economic interests, with the investment-reduction and inflation-control policies of the central government. Drawing upon institutional economics, he hypothesizes that the central government's powerful role in appointing and firing bureaucrats at the local level helps to reconcile some of the central-local economic policy differences. Huang uses systematic data analysis to test this proposition. This book also offers detailed descriptions of the roles of local governments in economic and investment management.
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administrative allocation appointment approval austerity period austerity policy Beijing budgetary Bureau bureaucratic integration bureaucratic variables cadres capital construction Center central government central investment central ministries central policy central projects central—local chapter Chen Yun China Chinese political Chubanshe coefficients constraints costs CPEs Cultural Revolution decentralization Deng Xiaoping dependent variable economic reforms effect enterprises example financing fiscal Gongzuo growth rates Guangdong Heilongjiang Henan hypothesis implementation incentive increase inflationary interests investment activities investment behavior investment control investment expansion investment growth investment planning investment projects investment reduction Jiangsu leaders leadership Li Peng localities macroeconomic macroeconomic policy measures ment million yuan monitoring moral hazard nomenklatura nomic Party secretaries percent personnel policy makers Politburo positions production provinces provincial officials quotas reduce renovation investments revenue secondary officials sectors share Soviet stability statistical targets tenure Tianjin tion World Bank Yao Yilin Zhao Ziyang Zhongguo
Page 343 - Shonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan gongbao [Bulletin of the State Council of the People's Republic of China], No. 13,1985, pp. 381-384. 19 See Ben kan ziliao shi [Journal Data Office], "Cong shiji ziliao kan guomin shengchan zongzhi. gongnongye zongchanzhi, guomin shouru sange zhibiao de guaxi" [A Look at the Relationship between Gross National Product.