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ISSUES IN THE THEORY OP IMPLICIT
MODELS OF IMPLICIT CONTRACTS
2 other sections not shown
absolute risk-aversion analysis approach argument assumed Assumption asymmetric information Azariadis characterized constraint contingent costs decrease degree of absolute denoted derived Economic Review Vol Economics Vol efficiency-wage efficient effort supply employed workers employment level enforcement entail ERSC ex-ante contracts ex-post exists expected utility fact firm firm's first-best contract given Grossman Hence human capital ICCw implicit contract theory implies incentive compatibility incentive scheme income income effect increase individual labor supply informational asymmetry involuntary unemployment J.E. Stiglitz Journal of Economics labor contracts labor market labor pool layoff range ment monitoring signal Moral Hazard nature negotiated Note observed open contract breaches optimal contract optimization problem output price Political Economy Vol possible principal-agent problem productivity shock pure layoff realization required effort level respect revenue risk-neutral risk-shifting second-best contract severance payments Shapiro-Stiglitz Shavell spot-market strategy stylized facts theory of implicit tion tract underemployment unem utility function wage-bill wage-income Wolfstetter yields