Insurance and Incentives in Labor Contracts: A Study in the Theory of Implicit Contracts |
Contents
CONTENTS | 1 |
ISSUES IN THE THEORY OF IMPLICIT | 47 |
MODELS OF IMPLICIT CONTRACTS | 146 |
Copyright | |
2 other sections not shown
Common terms and phrases
absolute risk-aversion analysis approach argument assumed asymmetric information Azariadis CALIFORNIA LIBRARY characterized constraint contingent costs decrease denoted derived Economic Review Vol Economics Vol efficiency-wage efficient effort supply employed workers employment level enforcement entail ERSC ex-ante contracts ex-post exists expected utility fact firm firm's first-best contract given Grossman Hence human capital implicit contract theory implies incentive compatibility incentive scheme income increase individual labor supply informational asymmetry involuntary unemployment J.E. Stiglitz Journal of Economics labor contracts labor market labor pool layoff range ment monitoring signal Moral Hazard nature negotiated Note observed open contract breaches optimal contract optimization problem output price Political Economy Vol possible principal-agent problem productivity shock pure layoff realization required effort level respect revenue risk-aversion risk-neutral risk-shifting second-best contract severance payments Shapiro-Stiglitz Shavell spot-market strategy theory of implicit tion tract U₁ underemployment UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA utility function wage-bill wage-income Wolfstetter yields