International Corporate Governance
Kose John, Anil K. Makhija
Emerald Group Publishing, Mar 31, 2011 - Business & Economics - 202 pages
Volume 14 of "Advances in Financial Economics" presents recent research on corporate governance from a number of countries across the world, including the United States, Spain, Malaysia, Israel and others. Many important corporate governance mechanisms are examined, such as board characteristics (size, independence, duality, staggered form), ownership structure, legal protection of shareholders, annual general meetings, and executive compensation. The findings have implications for mergers and acquisitions, IPOs, related party transactions, CEO pay, volume of trading and stock volatility, and underwriting. Thus, the implications of corporate governance for firm performance and shareholder experience are covered through the salient activities of firms.
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THE EFFECT OF CEO PAY ON FIRM VALUATION IN CLOSELY HELD FIRMS
EVIDENCE FROM BOND IPOs
THE USE OF WARRANTS IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN
EVIDENCE FROM PUBLIC LISTED FAMILY FIRMS IN MALAYSIA
DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MATTER? EVIDENCE FROM RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS IN MALAYSIA
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
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รรร abnormal returns agency costs announcement returns asset utilization ratio average bank bidder bidding firm bond IPO Bumiputras Bursa Malaysia capital CEO pay civil-law closely held firms coefficient companies concentrated ownership corporate governance corporate investors cumulative voting CVC investors deals debt dividends dual-class firms effects equity excess pay family and non-family family firms family ownership Financial Economics firm performance firm value firm’s free cash flow Genting Berhad governance characteristics higher Hypothesis impact independent directors industry information asymmetry problems initial public offerings investment IPO firm issues Jensen Journal of Financial mergers and acquisitions monitoring negative non-family ownership number of directors owner CEO p-value Panel payment method percent prestigious underwriters professional CEOs regression related party transactions resource legitimacy Rippington role sample shareholder rights Shleifer significant single-class firms subsample Table target total assets voting rights warrants young firm