International Institutions and National Policies
The proliferation of international institutions and their impact has become a central issue in international relations. Why do countries comply with international agreements and how do international institutions influence national policies? Most theories focus on the extent to which international institutions can wield 'carrots and sticks' directly in their relations with states. Xinyuan Dai presents an alternative framework in which they influence national policies indirectly by utilizing non-state actors (NGOs, social movements) and empowering domestic constituencies. In this way, even weak international institutions that lack 'carrots and sticks' may have powerful effects on states. Supported by empirical studies of environmental politics, human rights and economic and security issues, this book sheds fresh light on how and why international institutions matter. It will be of interest to students, scholars and policymakers in both international relations and international law.
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1985 Sulfur Protocol acid rain acid rain issue actors and domestic Alexeyeva 1985 alignment between victims Barsoom centralized monitoring channels of influence chapter Charter 77 collective action problems compliance decision compliance information compliance level compliance policy comply constructivist country’s CSCE Czechoslovakia detect noncompliance domestic constituency mechanism domestic environmental activism domestic interests domestic mechanisms domestic politics electoral leverage empirical empower domestic enforcement environmental regimes facilitate framework GATT/WTO government’s compliance Greenpeace Helsinki Accords Helsinki Final Act human rights activism human rights activists human rights regimes important informational status instance interest alignment interest groups international agreements international institutions influence Keohane low-cost monitors LRTAP Convention ments monitoring arrangements Moscow Helsinki group neoliberal neoliberal institutionalism noncompliance victims nonstate actors Prague Spring pro-compliance constituencies rationalist samizdat signatory countries Soviet Union specific sulfur emissions theory tion trade treaty organizations treaty regimes victims as low-cost victims of noncompliance voting weak international institutions West Germany