Investor Protection and Corporate Governance: Firm-level Evidence Across Latin America

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Alberto Chong, Florencio Lopez de Silanes
World Bank Publications, Jun 26, 2007 - Business & Economics - 580 pages
'Investor Protection and Corporate Governance' analyzes the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and valuation. Using unique datasets gathered at the firm-level the first such data in the region and results from a homogeneous corporate governance questionnaire, the book examines corporate governance characteristics, ownership structures, dividend policies, and performance measures. The book's analysis reveals the very high levels of ownership and voting rights concentrations and monolithic governance structures in the largest samples of Latin American companies up to now, and new data emphasize the importance of specific characteristics of the investor protection regimes in several Latin American countries. By and large, those firms with better governance measures across several dimensions are granted higher valuations and thus lower cost of capital. This title will be useful to researchers, policy makers, government officials, and other professionals involved in corporate governance, economic policy, and business finance, law, and management.

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Page v - Haber, AA and Jeanne Welch Milligan Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University; Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow, the Hoover Institution Eduardo Lora, Principal Adviser, Research Department, Inter-American Development Bank Jose Luis Machinea, Executive Secretary, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, United Nations Guillermo E.
Page 471 - high government officials are likely to demand special payments and illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government in the form of bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or loans.
Page 70 - Meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders...
Page 72 - Index created by examining and rating companies' 1990 annual reports on their inclusion or omission of 90 items. These items fall into seven categories (general information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow statement, accounting standards, stock data and special items). A minimum of 3 companies in each country were studied.
Page 70 - ... meeting is less than or equal to 1 0 per cent. The index ranges from 0 to 5. 2. Creditor rights: An index aggregating creditor rights. The index is formed by adding 1 when: 1. the country imposes restrictions, such as creditors' consent or minimum dividends, to file for reorganization; 2.
Page 469 - Code grants minority shareholders either a judicial venue to challenge the decisions of management or of the assembly or the right to step out of the company by requiring the company to purchase their shares when they object to certain fundamental changes, such as mergers, assets dispositions, and changes in the articles of incorporation. The variable equals 0 otherwise.
Page 72 - Average of the months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for less tradition for law and order.
Page v - ... disseminate information and analysis and convey the excitement and complexity of the most topical issues in economic and social development in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, and the World Bank. The manuscripts chosen for publication represent the highest quality in each institution's research and activity output and have been selected for their relevance to the...
Page 68 - Equals 1 if the Company Law or Commercial Code does not allow firms to require that shareholders deposit their shares prior to a General Shareholders Meeting thus preventing them from selling those shares for a number of days, and 0 otherwise.
Page 469 - ... shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders...

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