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absolute abstract apodictic apply apprehended aspect assumed Balfour belong causality ception co-existence concrete objects connection consciousness constitution contrast critical Critical philosophy determination distinction distinguish dogmatic dualism elements of knowledge existence experience explain external objects fact faculty fcap force forms of perception given hence imagination independent individual objects infinitely divisible intensive quantity Kant Kant's knowledge of real known objects ledge Lewes logical manifold of sense material body matter metaphysic mind molecular movements motion nature nervous structure noumena noumenon objects in space observation ordinary organism permanent phenomena philosophy point of view possible presupposes principles priori proof proposition psychology pure conceptions real knowledge real objects real sequences reality regard relative relativity of knowledge schema sciousness sensation separate series of feelings simply Spencer subject and object substance substratum succession suppose supposition synthetical theory of knowledge thought tion Transcendentalist unity University of Glasgow vidual
Page 56 - Thus perception of this permanent is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me; and consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of actual things which I perceive outside me.
Page 205 - In the representation /, the consciousness of myself is not an intuition, but a merely intellectual representation produced by the spontaneous activity of a thinking subject. It follows, that this / has not any predicate of intuition, which, in its character of permanence, could serve as correlate to the determination of time in the internal sense — in the same way as impenetrability is the correlate of matter as an empirical intuition.
Page 317 - An inconceivable proposition is one of which the terms cannot, by any effort, be brought before consciousness in that relation which the proposition asserts between them — a proposition of which the subject and the predicate offer an insurmountable resistance to union in thought. An unbelievable proposition is one which admits of being framed in thought, but is so much at variance with experience...
Page 53 - ... the representations which they cause in us by affecting our senses. Consequently I grant by all means that there are bodies without us, that is, things which, though quite unknown to us as to what they are in themselves, we yet know by the representations which their influence on our sensibility procures us, and which we call bodies, a term signifying merely the appearance of the thing which is unknown to us, but not therefore less actual. Can this be termed idealism? It is the very contrary.
Page 309 - Observe in the first place, that every one of the arguments by which the relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated, distinctly postulates the positive existence of something beyond the relative. To say that we cannot know the Absolute, is, by implication, to affirm that there is an Absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn what the Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption that it is; and the making of this assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to the mind, not as a...
Page 407 - ANDERSON— CLINICAL LECTURES ON THE CURABILITY OF ATTACKS OF TUBERCULAR . PERITONITIS AND ACUTE PHTHISIS (GALLOPING CONSUMPTION). By T. M'CALL ANDERSON, MD, Professor of Clinical Medicine in the University of Glasgow. Crown 8vo, Illustrated with Wood Engravings, as.
Page 14 - ... priori of objects, that is to say, the answer to the following questions: How is pure mathematical science possible? How is pure natural science possible? Respecting these sciences, as they do certainly exist, it may with propriety be asked, how they are possible? — for that they must be possible, is shown by the fact of their really existing.