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absolute abstract apodictic apply apprehended aspect assumed Balfour belong categories of relation causality ception co-existence concrete objects connection consciousness constitution contrast critical Critical philosophy determination distinction distinguish dogmatic dualism elements of knowledge existence experience explain external objects fact faculty force forms of perception given hence imagination independent individual objects infinitely divisible intensive quantity Kant Kant's knowledge of real known objects ledge Lewes logical manifold of sense material body matter metaphysic mind molecular movements motion nature nervous structure noumena noumenon objects in space observation ordinary organism permanent phenomena philosophy point of view possible presupposes principles priori proof proposition psychology pure conceptions real knowledge real objects real sequences reality regard relative relativity of knowledge schema sciousness sensation separate series of feelings simply Spencer subject and object substance substratum succession suppose supposition synthetical theory of knowledge thought tion Transcendentalist unity universal vidual
Page 58 - Thus perception of this permanent is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me; and consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of actual things which I perceive outside me.
Page 319 - An inconceivable proposition is one of which the terms cannot, by any effort, be brought before consciousness in that relation which the proposition asserts between them — a proposition of which the subject and the predicate offer an insurmountable resistance to union in thought. An unbelievable proposition is one which admits of being framed in thought, but is so much at variance with experience...
Page 55 - ... the representations which they cause in us by affecting our senses. Consequently I grant by all means that there are bodies without us, that is, things which, though quite unknown to us as to what they are in themselves, we yet know by the representations which their influence on our sensibility procures us, and which we call bodies, a term signifying merely the appearance of the thing which is unknown to us, but not therefore less actual. Can this be termed idealism? It is the very contrary.
Page 311 - Observe in the first place, that every one of the arguments by which the relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated, distinctly postulates the positive existence of something beyond the relative. To say that we cannot know the Absolute, is, by implication, to affirm that there is an Absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn what the Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption that it is; and the making of this assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to the mind, not as a...
Page 16 - ... priori of objects, that is to say, the answer to the following questions: How is pure mathematical science possible? How is pure natural science possible? Respecting these sciences, as they do certainly exist, it may with propriety be asked, how they are possible? — for that they must be possible, is shown by the fact of their really existing.
Page 326 - Existence means nothing more than persistence ; and hence in Mind that which persists in spite of all changes, and maintains the unity of the aggregate in defiance of all attempts to divide it, is that of which existence in the full sense of the werd must be predicated — that which we must postulate as the substance of Mind in contradistinction to the varying forms it assumes. But if so, the impossibility of knowing the substance of Mind is manifest.
Page 326 - Mind," is to be understood Mind as qualitatively differentiated in each portion that is separable by introspection but seems homogeneous and undecomposable ; then we do know something about the substance of Mind, and may eventually know more.