Kant and the Mind

Front Cover
Cambridge University Press, Apr 13, 1997 - Philosophy - 327 pages
Kant made a number of highly original discoveries about the mind--about its ability to synthesize a single, coherent representation of self and world, about the unity it must have to do so, and about the mind's awareness of itself and the semantic apparatus it uses to achieve this awareness. The past fifty years have seen intense activity in research on human cognition. Even so, not only have Kant's discoveries not been superseded, some of them have not even been assimilated into current thinking. That is particularly true of his work on unity and on the semantic apparatus of self-awareness.
 

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Contents

The contemporary relevance of Kants work
1
2 Kant functionalism and cognitive science
12
3 The resistance of materialists
14
Kants theory of the subject
24
the unity of experience
31
3 Kants doctrine of synthesis
34
4 The unity of consciousness
37
5 The kind of unity we have
40
Kants diagnosis of the Second Paralogism
152
1 The Paralogisms
154
2 Three claims from the subjective deduction
156
the strategies of rational psychology
160
4 The arguments for the Second Paralogism
165
5 The fourth part of Kants discussion
177
The Third Paralogism unity without identity over time
179
1 Situating the Third Paralogism
180

the mind as a representation
43
Kants conception of awareness and selfawareness
46
outer and inner sense
47
2 Two forms of selfawareness
55
awareness without selfawareness?
58
4 What is special about apperceptive selfawareness?
63
Kants theory of apperceptive selfawareness
70
the referential base of selfawareness
71
2 The sources of selfawareness
77
theory of the representational base
80
4 Why apperceptive selfawareness is the way it is
85
transcendental and empirical aspects of the self
90
The mind in the Critique of Pure Reason
95
1 Kants critical project and how the mind fits into it
96
2 The location of the subjective deduction in the first edition
108
synthesis and selfawareness
110
4 The mind and its awareness of itself in the second edition
113
5 The Fourth Paralogism and the Refutation of Idealism
117
6 Interpretive perplexities
118
The firstedition subjective deduction the object of one experience
119
I SYNTHESIS AND UNITY
120
2 Kitcher and Kants doctrine of synthesis
122
3 Apprehension reproduction and recognition in concepts
124
4 Apperception and the unity of individual objects
130
the unity of all appearances
132
6 Synchronic unity
141
II THE STRANGE CASE OF SELFAWARENESS AND THE DEDUCTION
144
2 Why did Kant introduce selfawareness into the deduction?
147
Z The structure of Kants discussion
183
3 Does unity or memory require identity?
185
4 Kant and Hume versus Butler and Reid and Strawson too
191
5 To what extent is the unity of consciousness diachronic?
195
time is in me
197
7 Identifying the subject with an object
201
8 Results and attitude
205
The secondedition subjective deduction selfrepresenting representations
208
2 The secondedition Transcendental Deduction
212
synthesis in the second edition
214
the new version of the central argument
216
5 The mind as representation
223
6 Selfrepresentation and selfawareness
230
final considerations
233
Nature and awareness of the self
235
2 Is a subject merely a formal requirement?
237
empirical versus transcendental apperception foundationalism
242
selfawareness and the noumenal mind
246
5 Why immediate awareness of the noumenal mind is not knowledge
252
6 Why did Kant claim that we are immediately aware of the noumenal mind?
254
the mind in the two versions of the deduction
256
8 Concluding remarks
258
Notes
260
Bibliography
291
Index of passages cited
297
General index
300
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