Jessica Brown, Mikkel Gerken
OUP Oxford, May 31, 2012 - Philosophy - 300 pages
Knowledge ascriptions, such as 'Sam knows that Obama is president of the United States', play a central role in our cognitive and social lives. For example, they are closely related to epistemic assessments of action. As a result, knowledge ascriptions are a central topic of research in both philosophy and science. In this collection of new essays on knowledge ascriptions, world class philosophers offer novel approaches to this long standing topic. The contributions exemplify three recent approaches to knowledge ascriptions. First, a linguistic turn according to which linguistic phenomena and theory are an important resource for providing an adequate account of knowledge ascriptions. Second, a cognitive turn according to which empirical theories from, for example, cognitive psychology as well as experimental philosophy should be invoked in theorizing about knowledge ascriptions. Third, a social turn according to which the social functions of knowledge ascriptions to both individuals and groups are central to understanding knowledge ascriptions. In addition, since knowledge ascriptions have figured very prominently in discussions concerning philosophical methodology, many of the contributions address or exemplify various methodological approaches. The editors, Jessica Brown and Mikkel Gerken, provide a substantive introduction that gives an overview of the various approaches to this complex debate, their interconnections, and the wide-ranging methodological issues that they raise.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Knowledge Ascriptions Their Semantics Cognitive Bases and Social Functions
2 Words Concepts and Epistemology
3 Arguing for Shifty Epistemology
4 Knowledge Bets and Interests
5 Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism and the Problem of Known Presuppositions
6 Abilities and KnowHow Attributions
7 On the Cognitive Bases of Knowledge Ascriptions
Other editions - View all
action agent answer appeal argue argument attributions of knowledge bank claim cognitive cognitive turn concept of knowledge considerations and thought-experiment contextualism contextualist Contrastivism Coraline Craig decision table decision theory defend DeRose dual process framework epistemic epistemology evidence evolutionary game theory example experimental explain fact fallibilism focal bias account forthcoming G-RIVKA Gerken Gettier group belief group knowledge Hannah heuristic instance interest-relativity intuitive judgments invariantist Jessica Brown judgments about knowledge justified Knobe know-how know(s knowledge ascriptions knowledge attributions knows Latinos linguistic considerations low stakes Nagel natural kind norm Noûs one’s ordinary Oxford University Press participants Philosophical plausible possibility pragmatic Previously High Stakes principles problem properly ignored proposition psychological question reason response role Rysiew salient alternative semantic sentence shifty skeptical pressure social Social Epistemology Stanley Stanovich strategy subject matter suggests swim Thelma and Louise theory thought-experiment judgements type 2 processes Weatherson Williamson