Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan

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Hurst, 2007 - Afghan War, 2001- - 259 pages
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Announcements of an impending victory over the Taliban have been repeated ad nauseam since the Allied invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, particularly after the Presidential elections of 2004, which were said to have marked the 'moral and psychological defeat of the Taliban'. In moments of triumphalism, some commentators claimed that 'reconstruction and development' had won over the population, despite much criticism of the meagre distribution of aid, the lack of 'nation-building' and corruption among Kabul's elite. In March 2006, both Afghan and American officials were still claiming, that 'the Taliban are no longer able to fight large battles'. In reality, there was a growing body of evidence that cast doubt on the official interpretation of the conflict. Rather than there having been a '2006 surprise', Giustozzi argues that the Neo-Taliban insurgency had put down strong roots in Afghanistan as early as 2003, a phenomenon he investigates in this timely and thought-provoking book

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About the author (2007)

Antonio Giustozzi has spent more than a decade visiting, researching, and writing on Afghanistan. He is based at the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics, where he focuses on the political aspects of insurgency and warlordism. His most recent book is "War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978-92,

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