Language in the World: A Philosophical Enquiry
What makes the words we speak mean what they do? Possible-worlds semantics articulates the view that the meanings of words contribute to determining which possible worlds would make a sentence true, and which would make it false. In the first book-length examination from this viewpoint, M.J. Cresswell argues that the nonsemantic facts on which semantic facts supervene are facts about the causal interactions between the linguistic behavior of speakers and the facts in the world that they are speaking about.
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actual actualistically Adriane and Bruce Adriane runs analysis arguments assume atomic sentences beliefs and desires believe Bruce runs Bruce sees David called category s/n causal chapter claim convention of truthfulness counterfactuals counterpart theory course Cresswell 1978 discussed distinction domain doxastic alternativeness English entities example exist existence-entailing expression in category false function functor going to Northampton grammar Gustav individuals intended interpretation isomorphic kind Lewis Lewis's linguistic logical look meaning metalanguage metaphysical modal n-tuple natural language notion one-place predicate ontological Oscar pairs plays the water possibilist possible worlds possible-worlds semantics propositional attitudes Putnam quantifiers question rain reason refer satisfy Schiffer seems semantic facts sense sentence set of worlds set-theoretical shew simply speakers Stalnaker suppose symbols syntactic categories Tarski theory things transmundism transmundist framework truth conditions truthfulness and trust Twin Earth two-place uttered variables water role word