Law and Economics in European Merger Control
Law and Economics in European Merger Control provides a thorough introduction to the economic theory underlying the regulation of mergers. The central economic concepts of efficiency and welfare are introduced and their role in the foundations of competition law is explained. Market structures of perfect competition, monopoly and oligopoly are analysed and the methods for delineating and evaluating the effects of mergers on markets are explained. Having examined the economic context, the book then proceeds to offer an exhaustive analysis of the application of economic theory in the practice of merger regulation in Europe. Through an analysis of more than 300 competition cases the book critiques the current state of EC competition law against its economic aims, and offers views for the future development of the law. It also sets out an account of the European Commission's search for a 'more economic approach' to competition law, and analyses the policy's successes and failures.
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analysis assessment of horizontal basis BGH judgment BKartA decision Bundeskartellamt collective dominance Commission Decision Commission’s concept conglomerate mergers considerable consumer surplus coordinated behaviour coordinated effects coordinated equilibrium creation or strengthening customers DE-R defined differentiated dominant position duopoly economic theory effective competition efficiency gains elasticity of demand established etseq European existence factors firm’s market foreclosure Guidelines higher price horizontal mergers hypothetical monopoly test Ibid incentive to deviate input Lerner index marginal cost market definition market entry market power market shares market transparency merged entity merged firm merger control Merger Regulation merging parties monopolist Nash equilibrium network effects non-coordinated effects ofthe oligopolistic oligopoly perfect competition possible practice presumption price elasticity price increase product market profit prohibition quantity recital reduce regarded relevant market result significant SSNIP strategy suppliers supply switch tion undertakings vertical merger welfare standard Whilst WuW/E BGH WuW/E DE-V