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Abreu advantaged firm analysis Author Title circumstances entry collusive outcome concentration may arise constraints Cournot competition Cournot duopoly Cournot—Nash equilibrium degree of concentration denote deviate discount factor Economics ECO Elettra AGLIARDI equilibrium actions EUI Working Paper European University Institute exit and changes firm can learn following expression given implications of learning-by-doing individually e.g. EUI inducing exit infinite horizon model initial cost advantage intensity of learning learning effects learning is sufficiently learning possibilities Let us consider limit-pricing Marcus MILLER marginal cost Mark SALMON Market Structures monopolist monopoly Nash equilibrium numbered individually e.g. Oligopoly order conditions outcome path output level parameter values Peter Policy presence of learning presence of learning-by-doing produce profit function punishment pure strategy qm(c rate of learning repeated game Revelation Principle rival second period separating equilibrium signalling games socially managed industry spillovers Stephen MARTIN subgame perfect equilibrium sunk cost surplus maximization uninformed player values of qj