Legislative Oversight and Budgeting: A World Perspective

Front Cover
Rick Stapenhurst
World Bank Publications, 2008 - Business & Economics - 342 pages
In most countries, parliament has the constitutional mandate to both oversee and hold government to account. In light of the increased focus on good governance, academics and legislative strengthening practitioners are re-examining parliament's oversight function with a view to increasing public financial accountability, curbing corruption, and contributing to poverty reduction. This volume brings together research from many different perspectives and many different legislative settings worldwide. As the country case studies in section III demonstrate, the accountability mechanisms or oversight tools available to the legislature vary based on constitutionally defined powers of the legislature, institutional arrangements between the branches of government, divisions of authority between national, regional, and local governments, the degree of legitimacy conferred on the legislature, and the resources available to it. The budget process provides critical opportunities. Section II of this volume is devoted to examining budget oversight from the formulation and approval of the budget, to implementation and the ex post examination of the public accounts. Special attention is also paid to mechanisms to assist parliaments such as Public Accounts Committees and independent parliamentary budget offices. This title will be of interest to parliamentarians and parliamentary staff, legislative strengthening practitioners, and students of legislative development.
 

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Contents

Annex Table 1 Number of Oversight Tools and the Probability That a Country Is Formally Democratic
23
Annex Table 2 Number of Oversight Tools and the Probability That a Country Is Liberal Democratic
24
Table 21 Correlation Analysis of Level of Democracy and Oversight Tools
32
Table 22 Logistic Regression with Formal Democratic Status as a Dependent Variable
33
Table 24 Oversight Tools Income Level and Democracy
34
Table 26a Number of Oversight Acts in Italys LegislatureChamber of Deputies 1976 to 2001
36
Table 26b Number of Oversight Acts from the 7th to the 13th Italian Senate
37
Table 27a The Upward Trend in Oversight ActsChamber of Deputies
38
Table 28b Interpellations Directed to the Ministry of Budget from the Senate
39
Table 29b Interpellations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Senate
40
Table 210 Effectiveness of Oversight Tools in the 14th Legislature
41
II OVERSIGHT AND THE BUDGET PROCESS
49
The Budget Process
53
Box 31 Brazilian Congress and the Budget Process
54
Box 32 Ghanas Parliament and Introducing Value Added Tax
55
Table 31 Legislatures Powers to Amend the Budget
56
Box 33 The Polish Parliaments Budget Research Office
57
Figure 32 Fiduciary Obligation
58
Box 34 Enhancing Financial Transparency by Broadening Access to Information
59
Box 35 Analyzing the Political Context
62
Figure 41 Model of a Controlled Process
70
Table 51 Spearman Correlations between Indices
87
Figure 51 Index of Legislative Budget Institutions
89
Table 52 Comparison of BudgetAmending and NonBudgetAmending Legislatures
90
Annex Table 1 Data for the Index and Amendment Dummy
92
Annex Table 2 Construction of Composite Variables
93
Table 61 When Does the Executive Release a Prebudget Statement to the Public?
101
Table 62 Does the Prebudget Statement Describe the Governments Macroeconomic and Fiscal Framework?
102
Table 63 Does the Prebudget Statement Describe the Governments Policies and Priorities That Will Guide the Development of Detailed Estimates for ...
103
Table 64 Are Any Arrangements in Place for the Legislature to Establish Aggregate Expenditure Ceilings before Beginning Debate on Individual Ex...
104
Table 65 In Practice Does the Legislature Generally Approve the Budget as Presented by the Executive?
106
Are Practices and Procedures Important for the Success of a PAC?
124
Table 85 The Least Important Practices and Dynamics for the Success of the PAC
125
Table 91 Distribution of CBO Staff
135
Table 101 Characteristics of Budget Offices Reviewed
155
III COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
159
Table 121 Federal Budget Laws 19922002
176
Box 131 Objectives and Tasks for Scrutiny Committees
189
Table 141 Government and Opposition Average Party Cohesion 199198
196
Table 142 Estimated Veto Frequency 199198
197
Figure 181 Governance of the Budget
245
Table 181 Legislative Capabilities Index in Latin America 2005
246
Figure 182 Budget Institutions and Fiscal Discipline in Latin America 2000
248
Table 182 Legal Framework of Budgetary Systems in Latin America 2005
249
Figure 183 Reform Path of Budget Institutions in Latin America 19902005
250
Figure 184 Index of Legislative Budgeting in Latin America 2003
251
Table 183 ExecutiveLegislative Budget Relations in Latin America
252
Table 191 Italian Budget Laws for 1982 to 2001
273
Table 192 Regression Analyses
274
Table 201 Deputies Perception of Importance of Individual Activities of the Parliament 1993 to 2003
282
Table 202 Voting on the State Budgets in the 1st Electoral Term
283
Table 206 Committees according to Their Prestige in the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic
284
Table 207 Activity of the Budget Committee over Five Terms 19902004
286
Table 208 Fulfillment of the State Budget between 1991 and 2003
288
Annex Table 201 The Composition of the Government and Its Support in the Parliament
290
Table 211 Top 10 Political Parties in the 1999 and 2004 General Elections
295
Box 211 The Role of the House of Regional Representatives DPD in the Budget Process
300
The Role of Budget Brokers
303
Annex DPR Sectoral Commissions and Their Government Working Counterparts
306
Index
333
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