Letter of the Secretary of War, Transmitting Report on the Organization of the Army of the Potomac, and of Its Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland, Under the Command of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, from July 26, 1861, to November 7, 1862
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1864 - 242 頁
讀者評論 - 撰寫評論
其他版本 - 查看全部
advance approaches army arrived artillery Assistant attack August bank battery battle bridge brigade camp campaign Captain carry cavalry Colonel column command communication condition corps cover crossed defence delay despatch direction division duty enemy enemy's entire field fire flank force formed forward Franklin front G. B. MCCLELLAN general-in-chief give ground guard guns HALLECK Harper's Ferry HEADQUARTERS ARMY heavy hill hold House immediately important infantry instructions land leave Major Manassas Maryland means miles Monroe morning move movement necessary night occupied October officers once operations organization pass Pennsylvania Porter position possible Potomac present President probably railroad re-enforcements reached rear rebels received regard regiments reserve Richmond river road Secretary secure sent side soon strong Sumner supplies taken telegraphed thousand transportation troops United vicinity Virginia volunteers Washington whole woods York Yorktown
第 43 頁 - My dear Sir : — You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac — yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas. If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours.
第 43 頁 - That the heads of departments and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the general-in-chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.
第 219 頁 - President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south. Your army must move now, while the roads are good.
第 145 頁 - It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State, in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, or forcible abolition of slavery, should be contemplated for a moment.
第 96 頁 - York rivers, than by a land march. In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond, at the earliest moment, General McDowell has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route. He is ordered, keeping himself always in position to save the capital from all possible attack, so to operate, as to put his left wing in communication with your right, and you are instructed to cooperate, so as to establish this communication as soon as possible. By extending your right...
第 4 頁 - ... to detach largely from their main body in order to protect such of their cities as may be threatened, or else landing and forming establishments on their coast at any favorable places that opportunity might offer. This naval force should also cooperate with the main army in its efforts to seize the important seaboard towns of the rebels.
第 47 頁 - He must do this; for should he permit u# to occupy Richmond, his destruction can be averted only by entirely defeating us in a battle, in which he must be the assailant. This movement, if successful, gives us the capital, the communications, the supplies of the rebels; Norfolk would fall; all the waters of the Chesapeake would be ours; all Virginia would be in our power, and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee and North Carolina.
第 84 頁 - And once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. / am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I' always insisted that going down the Bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy, and the same or equal intrenchments...
第 156 頁 - You, General, certainly could not .have been more pained at receiving my order, than I was at the necessity of issuing it. I was advised by high officers, in whose judgment I had great confidence, to make the order immediately on my arrival here, but I determined not to do so until I could learn your...