Linguistic Philosophy: The Central Story
How much authority should language, the medium of communication, be accorded as a determinant of truth and therefore of what we say? Garth L. Hallett argues that, although never explicitly debated, this is the most significant issue of linguistic philosophy. Here, for the first time, he traces the issue’s story. Starting with representative thinkers—Plato, Aquinas, Kant, Frege, and the early Wittgenstein—who contested language’s authority, the narrative then focuses on thinkers such as Carnap, Tarski, the later Wittgenstein, Flew, Russell, Malcolm, Austin, Kripke, Putnam, Strawson, Quine, and Habermas who, in different ways and to varying degrees, accorded language more authority. Implicit in this account is a challenge to philosophy as still widely practiced.
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2 The Questions Centrality
3 Platos Recourse to Nonlinguistic Forms
4 Aquinas and the Primacy of Mental Truth
Precise Thought versus Imprecise Language
6 Carnaps Limited Linguistic Turn
7 Tarski Truth and Claims of Linguistic Incoherence
8 Wittgensteins Acceptance of the Authority of Language
13 Austin Statementsand Their Truth
From Meaning to Truth
15Kripke Putnam and Rigid Designation
16Quine Linguistic Truthsand Holistic Theory
17 Quine Indeterminacyand the Opacity of Language
18 Rorty Stich and Pragmatic Assertability
19 Habermas Communicative Speech and Validity
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analysis analytic philosophy analytic-synthetic distinction Aquinas atoms Austin authority of language bachelor beliefs Carnap chapter claim common concepts context Cratylus determine Dummett employed essence everyday example explained explication expressions fact false formulation Frege guage Habermas Ibid identity illocutionary instance interest intuitions Issue of Language’s kind knowledge Kripke Kripke’s language-game Language’s Authority Linguistic Correspondence linguistic philosophy linguistic turn logical look Malcolm meaning mental metaphysical Moore Moore’s Naming and Necessity natural nonlinguistic objects one’s ordinary language original emphasis philoso Philosophical Investigations Plato pragmatic precise predication Principle of Relative propositions Putnam question Quine Quine’s reality reason Relative Similarity resembles rigid designation rival Rorty Russell Russell’s scientific semantic sense sentence speak speaker speech speech acts statements Stich suggest Tarski theory things thinkers thinking thought tion Tractarian Tractatus Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus true Truetemp Twin-Earth usage utterances verbal verdict Wittgenstein words
Page 4 - We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds - and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.