Living without Free Will
Most people assume that, even though some degenerative or criminal behavior may be caused by influences beyond our control, ordinary human actions are not similarly generated, but rather are freely chosen, and we can be praiseworthy or blameworthy for them. A less popular and more radical claim is that factors beyond our control produce all of the actions we perform. It is this hard determinist stance that Derk Pereboom articulates in Living Without Free Will. Pereboom argues that our best scientific theories have the consequence that factors beyond our control produce all of the actions we perform, and that because of this, we are not morally responsible for any of them. He seeks to defend the view that morality, meaning and value remain intact even if we are not morally responsible, and furthermore, that adopting this perspective would provide significant benefit for our lives.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
1 Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories
2 Coherence Objections to Libertarianism
3 Empirical Objections to AgentCausal Libertarianism
4 Problems for Compatibilism
5 The Contours of Hard Incompatibilism
Other editions - View all
action actual causal history agent causation agent is morally agent-causal libertarianism agent-causal power agent’s control alien-deterministic events alternative possibilities argues argument behavior believe blameworthy causal powers causally determined cause ceteris paribus challenge claim condition criminal decision desire deter determinism is true deterministic deterrence theory emergentism evade taxes event-causal example explanation Frankfurt Frankfurt-style free will required Freedom Galen Strawson Ginet Haji Haji’s hard determinism hard determinist hard incompatibilism hard incompatibilist harm higher-level Honderich human Humean indeterminism interpersonal relationships Jones Jones’s justified Kane Kane’s kill Smith legitimate Libertarian Freedom life-hopes manipulated Metaphysics moral reason moral reason occur moral responsibility nevertheless objection one’s partially random events perform Philosophical plausible position praiseworthy principle produce punishment quantum indeterminacy quantum mechanics rational reactive attitudes reasons-responsiveness relationships relevant required for moral result role second-order desire sense required Significance ofFree Smilansky strategy Strawson sufficient suppose tion truly random undermined University Press