Lost Promise: How CIA Analysis Misserves the Nation : an Intelligence Assessment
Lost Promise describes and criticises the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency - the analytical arm of the Agency. Gentry first describes the DI's historical role and avowed mission, and by so doing sets a standard for comparison with the troubled operations of the DI since the early 1980s. He proposes an 18 point reform programme and helps to lift the fog that surrounds the CIA and protects it from serious external evaluation. Gentry ventures to correct misunderstandings about CIA analysis and explains how analysis can become biased or politicised. Lost Promise presents a framework for evaluating intelligence analysis in general, using the DI as a case study.
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CIAs Directorate of Intelligence
The Institution in Practice
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