Malta and British Strategic Policy, 1925-43

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Psychology Press, 2004 - History - 244 pages
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A major reassessment of a key aspect of British strategy and defence policy in the first half of the twentieth century.

The main contribution of this new study is an investigation of the role of Malta in British military strategy, as planned and as it actually developed, in the period between the mid 1920s and the end of the war in North Africa in May 1943. It demonstrates that the now widely accepted belief that Malta was 'written off as indefensible' before the war was mistaken, and focuses on Malta's actual wartime role in the Mediterranean war, assessing the numerous advantages, many often ignored, that the British derived from retention of the island. The conclusions made challenge recent assertions that Malta's contribution was of limited value and will be of great interest to both students and professionals in the field.

 

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Contents

The Base at Malta in the 1920s
6
The Failure to Strengthen Maltas Defences 193035
20
Malta in the Abyssinian Crisis 193536
35
Prelude to War 193639
49
Final Preparations for War
64
The Initial Onslaught
91
The German Intervention in the Mediterranean in 1941
107
Maltas Contribution to Crusader
123
The 1942 Siege of Malta
143
Maltas Contribution to the Recovery of North Africa
159
Conclusion
181
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About the author (2004)

Douglas Austin was born in Malta and served in the RAF before a career in banking in New York and London. In 2002 he gained a Ph.D at University College, London in military history.

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