Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium
Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Office of International Affairs, Policy and Global Affairs, National Academy of Sciences
National Academies Press, Jan 15, 1994 - Science - 258 pages
Within the next decade, many thousands of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons are slated to be retired as a result of nuclear arms reduction treaties and unilateral pledges. A hundred tons or more of plutonium and tons of highly enriched uranium will no longer be needed. The management and disposition of these fissile materials, the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons, pose urgent challenges for international security.
This book offers recommendations for all phases of the problem, from dismantlement of excess warheads, through intermediate storage of the fissle materials they contain, to ultimate disposition of the plutonium.
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Task and Context
2 International Context
3 Criteria for Comparing Management and Disposition Options
4 Declarations and Dismantlement
5 Intermediate Storage
6 LongTerm Disposition
Appendix A List of Principal Briefings
Appendix B Profiles of Civilian Plutonium Programs
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additional agreement approach arms reduction borehole CANDU reactors canisters CISAC civilian plutonium committee cost criteria decades deep boreholes designed dismantled weapons disposition of excess disposition options emplacement excess weapons plutonium existing fissile materials former Soviet Union fuel cycle fuel fabrication geologic repositories IAEA involved isotopes issues kilograms licensing long-term disposition LWRs management and disposition military MINATOM monitoring MOX fabrication MOX fuel National nonproliferation Nuclear Fuel nuclear fuel cycles nuclear power nuclear weapons nuclear weapons complex ocean operating Pantex percent pits planned plutonium and HEU plutonium disposition mission plutonium fuel plutonium storage political potential production programs proliferation risks radioactive rated reactor-grade plutonium regime reprocessing Russia safeguards and security safety security risks separated plutonium Soviet Union spent fuel standard START II steps stockpile stocks stored substantial technical tons of plutonium tritium Ukraine United vitrification warheads waste weapons and fissile weapons-grade plutonium