Managing competition in the health insurance market
William Jack, Australian National University. Faculty of Economics and Commerce, Australian National University. Research School of Social Sciences. Economics Program
Faculty of Economics & Commerce, and Economics Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1998 - Health insurance - 36 pages
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
assumption asymmetric information Atsushi Kajii Australian National University Ceteris paribus Characterisation comparative static results cost-reducing effort coverage covered individuals cream-skimming define distribution of low effort and selection endogenous premium equilibrium choices equilibrium effort equilibrium selection levels Exogenously set premiums expected benefit payout firm i's market firm i's profits function given globally optimal Health Economics health insurance high risk individuals insurance companies insurer's Journal of Health large number low risk individuals marginal cost Moral Hazard negative number of firms number of insurers numbers of low optimal transfer rate population premiums are set price competition product differentiation Proposition quadratic right hand side risk adjustment transfer risk attributes risk selection risk type second order conditions select good risks selection activities selection choices selection costs set exogenously Simon Grant small positive transfer socially optimal strategically by firms symmetric equilibrium symmetric Nash equilibrium Thisse transportation costs William Jack yield zero profits zero selection region