Maneuver Warfare Handbook

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Avalon Publishing, Aug 6, 1985 - History - 152 pages
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Maneuver warfare, often controversial and requiring operational and tactical innovation, poses perhaps the most important doctrinal questions currently facing the conventional military forces of the U.S. Its purpose is to defeat the enemy by disrupting the opponent's ability to react, rather than by physical destruction of forces. This book develops and explains the theory of maneuver warfare and offers specific tactical, operational, and organizational recommendations for improving ground combat forces. The authors translate concepts—too often vaguely stated by manuever warfare advocates—into concrete doctrine. Although the book uses the Marine Corps as a model, the concepts, tactics, and doctrine discussed apply to any ground combat force.
 

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Contents

Introduction
2
The Theory of Maneuver Warfare
5
Tactics and Operations
10
Techniques and Organization
26
Amphibious Operations
37
Education and Training
42
Conclusion
50
Notes
53
Foreword
70
Introduction
72
Surfaces and Gaps
74
Mission Tactics
92
The Main Effort
108
The Concept of the Objective
124
The Concept of the Reserve
130
Copyright

Annotated Bibliography
59

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Page 1 - Despite its outstanding record as a combat force in the past war, the Marine Corps' far greater contribution to victory was doctrinal: that is, the fact that the basic amphibious doctrines which carried Allied troops over every beachhead of World War II had been largely shaped — often in the face of uninterested or doubting military orthodoxy — by US Marines, and mainly between 1922 and 1935.
Page 1 - Corps' far greater contribution to victory was doctrinal: that is, the fact that the basic amphibious doctrines which carried Allied troops over every beachhead in World War II had been largely shaped ... by the US Marines."51 When Rear Admiral William V.
Page xi - But there are over two thousand years of experience to tell us that the only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out.

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About the author (1985)

William S. Lind was assistant for military affairs to U.S. Senator Gary Hart.

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