Market discipline in banking reconsidered: the roles of funding manager decisions and deposit insurance reform

Front Cover
Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve Board, 2004 - Business & Economics - 34 pages
0 Reviews
"We find that the risk-sensitivity of bank holding company subordinated debt spreads at issuance increased with regulatory reforms that were designed to reduce conjectural government guarantees, but declined somewhat with subsequent reforms that were aimed in part at reducing regulatory forbearance. In addition, we test and find evidence for a straightforward form of "market discipline:" The extent to which bond issuance penalizes relatively risky banks. Evidence for such discipline only appears in the periods after conjectural government guarantees were reduced"--Abstract.

From inside the book

What people are saying - Write a review

We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.

Common terms and phrases

Bibliographic information