Media Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership Matters

Couverture
Cambridge University Press, 11 déc. 2006
Firmly rooting its argument in democratic and economic theory, the book argues that a more democratic distribution of communicative power within the public sphere and a structure that provides safeguards against abuse of media power provide two of three primary arguments for ownership dispersal. It also shows that dispersal is likely to result in more owners who will reasonably pursue socially valuable journalistic or creative objectives rather than a socially dysfunctional focus on the 'bottom line'. The middle chapters answer those agents, including the Federal Communication Commission, who favor 'deregulation' and who argue that existing or foreseeable ownership concentration is not a problem. The final chapter evaluates the constitutionality and desirability of various policy responses to concentration, including strict limits on media mergers.
 

Table des matières

Section 1
6
Section 2
19
Section 3
26
Section 4
48
Section 5
54
Section 6
60
Section 7
76
Section 8
88
Section 11
124
Section 12
125
Section 13
130
Section 14
138
Section 15
142
Section 16
152
Section 17
163
Section 18
165

Section 9
97
Section 10
108
Section 19
168
Section 20
182

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Media Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership Matters
C. Edwin Baker
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Expressions et termes fréquents

advertising aims Amendment antitrust laws audience benefits blogs broadcast cable systems chapter Chicago School economic choice claim communicative power Compaine Compaine's companies competition comScore concern constitutional consumer consumer sovereignty corporate costs create Daily Kos democracy democratic distribution democratic role discourse dispersal of media diversity dominant economic editorial editorial independence effect egalitarian empirical evaluate example exist favor FCC’s goal identify incentives increase individual intermediate scrutiny Internet issue journalism journalistic limits marketplace of ideas mass media media concentration media entities media markets media mergers media owners media products media-specific ment Miami Herald monopoly newspaper objections ownership dispersal papers percent perspective political possible potential power over price predictably Press Clause press freedom problem profit-maximizing profits prohibited public sphere purchase purposes reason reduce relevant reported requires rules scrutiny significant speech stations structural regulation subsidies Supreme Court Technorati tion

Fréquemment cités

Page 5 - Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament ; but, in the Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all. It is not a figure of speech, or a witty saying ; it is a literal fact,— very momentous to us in these times.
Cité dans 158 livres de 1840 à 2008

Références à ce livre

À propos de l'auteur (2006)

C. Edwin Baker is the Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and has been on the faculty at Penn since 1981. He also taught at NYU, Chicago, Cornell, Texas, Oregon, and Toledo law schools and at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, and he was a staff attorney for the ACLU. He is the author of three earlier books: Media, Markets, and Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2002), which won the 2002 McGannon Communications Policy Research Award; Advertising and a Democratic Press (1994); and Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (1989). He has written more than fifty academic articles about free speech, equality, property, law and economics, jurisprudence, and the mass media, in addition to occasional popular commentary.

Informations bibliographiques

TitreMedia Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership Matters
Communication, Society and Politics
AuteurC. Edwin Baker
ÉditeurCambridge University Press, 2006
ISBN1139461036, 9781139461030
  
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