Mergers and Competition in the Airline Industry: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-ninth Congress, Second Session ... April 23 and May 1, 1986, Volume 4

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Page 32 - ... may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or which in any other manner would be in restraint of trade, unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served.
Page 32 - The party challenging the transaction shall bear the burden of proving the anticompetitive effects of such transaction, and the proponents of the transaction shall bear the burden of proving that it meets the significant transportation conveniences and needs of the public and that such conveniences and needs may not be satisfied by a less anticompetitive alternative.
Page 47 - Thank you for the opportunity to present our views. I will be happy to answer any questions that the subcommittee may have.
Page 52 - ... this industry. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 was described by a Wall street investment banker as one of the strongest anti-labor bills ever enacted. We agree. Certainly, it has proved to be the most effective anti-labor legislation enacted in the Twentieth Century.
Page 10 - ... the Federal Aviation Act, as amended by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, with due regard for the goals expressed therein of fostering competition, preventing unfair methods of competition in air transportation, and maintaining essential air transportation; and [Add as a new provision to S.
Page 77 - G. Douglas & J. Miller, Economic Regulation of Domestic Air Transport; Theory and Policy 43 (1974). they judge that the improvements are ^orth the nrice. But in the artificial environment of the regulated conference, a "service extra" costs the shipper nothing — that is, he pays the same price whether he gets the innovation or not.
Page 47 - LFPs, the resolution of such conflict can be delayed for years, and employee groups may have a motivation to resort to self help. However, because standard labor protective provisions have been in use for close to thirty years, they offer a reliable and stable procedure that promotes trust between the parties and that encourages discussion of difficult issues on an accelerated schedule.
Page 45 - LPPs, afforded to airline employees affected by commercial transactions subject to government approval . While LPPs were normally applied in merger cases, the Civil Aeronautics Board also recognized that they were needed in functionally similar transactions because the need for such conditions depended on economic considerations and not merely on the fora of the business arrangement.
Page 79 - Index (HHI). determine whether the market is concentrated, and by how much the merger would increase concentration. If the market is concentrated and the merger would significantly increase concentration, then we consider other relevant factors that indicate whether the merger carries a substantial probability of significantly increasing unilateral or collective market power — that is.
Page 49 - We believe that the purely competitive antitrust aspects of a merger should be passed upon by the Department of Justice. All other aspects of the merger should be relegated to the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation, with the exception of the...

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