Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics

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Cambridge University Press, Feb 24, 1989 - Philosophy - 340 pages
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This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundations of ethics. These issues concern the objectivity of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalist world-view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational lifeplan. In striking contrast to traditional and more recent work in the field, David Brink offers an integrated defense of the objectivity of ethics.
 

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Contents

MORAL REALISM AND MORAL INQUIRY
14
EXTERNALIST MORAL REALISM
37
DOES MORAL REALISM MATTER?
81
A COHERENTIST MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY
100
MORAL REALISM AND THE ISOUGHT THESIS
144
A POSTERIORI OBJECTIONS TO MORAL REALISM
171
OBJECTIVE UTILITARIANISM
211
Must an infinite regress of justification
291
The isought thesis and intuitionism
301
Bibliography
323
Index
335
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Law and Disagreement
Jeremy Waldron
No preview available - 1999
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