Mutual Expectations: A Conventionalist Theory of Law
The law persists because people have reasons to comply with its rules. What characterizes those reasons is their interdependence: each of us only has a reason to comply because he or she expects the others to comply for the same reasons. The rules may help us to solve coordination problems, but the interaction patterns regulated by them also include Prisoner's Dilemma games, Division problems and Assurance problems. In these "games" the rules can only persist if people can be expected to be moved by considerations of fidelity and fairness, not only of prudence.
This book takes a fresh look at the perennial problems of legal philosophy - the source of obligation to obey the law, the nature of authority, the relationship between law and morality, and the nature of legal argument - from the perspective of this conventionalist understanding of social rules. It argues that, since the resilience of such rules depends on cooperative dispositions, conventionalism, properly understood, does not imply positivism.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
A CONVENTIONALIST THEORY OF SOCIAL RULES AND OBLIGATIONS
THE STRUCTURE OF OBLIGATORY NORMS
THE ROLE OF SANCTIONS
POLITICAL OBLIGATION ITS GROUNDS AND LIMITS
THE OBLIGATION TO OBEY THE LAW
LAW AND AUTHORITY
AUTHORITY AND RATIONALITY
MORAL ARGUMENT AND CONVENTION
Other editions - View all
accept action antipositivism appeal argued authoritative balance of reasons basic behaviour believe chapter choice claim communitarian comply conception consent theory considerations content-independent contribute cooperative dispositions cooperative virtue coordinating authority Coordination game coordination problem courts decide decision duty Dworkin epistemic authority exclusionary reasons exercise existence fact follow force formal conventions game theory Hart Hartogh hence identify interdependent reasons internal point interpretation ISBN Joseph Raz judge judgment justified legal philosophy legal system MacCormick meaning moral argument moral reasons mutual expectations Nash equilibrium nature non-excludable norms obey the law obligation to obey outcome particular pattern of expectations pattern of mutual person players point of view political obligation positivism positivist possible preferences principle of fairness Prisoner's Dilemma ratio decidendi rational recognize relevant require rule of recognition Simmons simply social rules Socrates statute substantial conventions Suppose true valid values and principles Wolff