Napoleon and Berlin: The Franco-Prussian War in North Germany, 1813

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University of Oklahoma Press, 2002 - History - 384 pages

At a time when Napoleon needed all his forces to reassert French dominance in Central Europe, why did he fixate on the Prussian capital of Berlin? Instead of concentrating his forces for a decisive showdown with the enemy, he repeatedly detached large numbers of troops, under ineffective commanders, toward the capture of Berlin. In Napoleon and Berlin, Michael V. Leggiere explores Napoleon’s almost obsessive desire to capture Berlin and how this strategy ultimately lost him all of Germany.

Napoleon’s motives have remained a subject of controversy from his own day until ours. He may have hoped to deliver a tremendous blow to Prussia’s war-making capacity and morale. Ironically, the heavy losses and strategic reverses sustained by the French left Napoleon’s Grande Armee vulnerable to an Allied coalition that eventually drove Napoleon from Central Europe forever.

 

Contents

The Defense of Berlin
3
Opening Moves
141
Groß Beeren
171
The Politics of Dissension
177
Dennewitz
189
At the Rubicon
212
Crossing the Rubicon
229
Leipzig
324
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About the author (2002)

Michael V. Leggiere is Assistant Professor of History at Louisiana State University, Shreveport.

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