On the Feasibility of a One Or Multi-speed European Monetary Union
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993 - Monetary unions - 30 pages
This paper addresses two questions: (1) Is a twelve country monetary union in Europe feasible; (2) Can monetary union be achieved at multi-speed, i.e., with a rust group of countries going first, and later admitting the others? After examining several politico-economic arguments concerning problems of feasibility of the union, we conclude with a fair amount of skepticism concerning the multi-speed idea. We show that the final result of the process of monetary integration is dependent upon at "how many speeds" Europe will proceed. Our discussion of feasibility shed some light on the political economy of the recent (Fall of 1992) turmoil in the monetary system of Europe.
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