Organizational Myopia: Problems of Rationality and Foresight in Organizations
Could the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers have been avoided? What about the recent global financial crisis? Behind these apparently very different events it is possible to identify a common element of organizational myopia - a syndrome that severely limits the capacity of organizations to foresee the effects of their own decisions and to recognize signs of danger or opportunity. Based on several case studies, Organizational Myopia explores the barriers that impede organizations from identifying an effective response to the problems which they have to confront. Using real-world cases, the author investigates the mechanisms that generate myopia in organizations at the individual, organizational and interorganizational level in contexts that are complex, uncertain, ambiguous and changeable. This book will help readers understand how to limit the origins of myopia and therefore increase the capacity of organizations to anticipate and contain unexpected events.
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9/11 Commission Report 9/11 terrorist attacks abductive reasoning accident action activity afﬁrms agencies aircraft ambiguous analysis Arthur Andersen auditing companies auditors aware behavior beneﬁts bias changes cognitive Columbia complex conﬂict consequences context coordination culture danger decision makers defense system deﬁned develop difﬁcult disaster economic effective efﬁciency Enron environment errors evaluation ex ante ex post example fact factors failure ﬁeld ﬁnancial crisis ﬁrst ﬁve ﬂight hierarchy High Reliability Organizations hijacking hindsight bias HROs identiﬁed increase individual inﬂuence interorganizational interpretations involved izational KPMG launch limited logic Luftwaffe moai NASA NCTA NEADS Neuroeconomics NORAD O-rings ofthe operators organizational learning organizational myopia Parmalat Perrow political possible potential predictable surprise problems rational relation Reliability Organizations response result risk safety shuttle signiﬁcant situations social speciﬁc strategy structure Sutcliffe 2007 theory threats tion Turner and Pidgeon uncertainty Vaughan warning signs weak signs Weick and Sutcliffe