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The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation June 1966 3
The Setting of the Problem March 1967 12
Arms Interactions and Arms Control September 1968 23
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alarm allocation alternatives arms control assessment assumptions budget bureaucratic centralization choice conclusions conflict cost-effectiveness cost-effectiveness analysis costs decision theory decisionmaking decisions defense Department of Defense depends deployment effect environment example existing external force structure formal free-standing function future hedging implies important interpretation intuition issues judgment less limited logical major mathematical analysis mathematical model ment meta-model military missiles nations Nonetheless nonverbal thought nuclear capabilities nuclear spread nuclear weapons objectives offensive operations optimal options organization organizational PCPs perspective planning plutonium policy analysis political potential predictions Prisoner's Dilemma proliferation quantifiable problems quantitative methodology question Rand Rand Corporation reason recognize regarding response risk role secondary labor market Services Soviet Union specific squishy problems strategic studies substantive problem surrogate systems analysis theory threat tion tive Tobit model traders uncertainties understanding United validity variables verbal wage rate weapon systems