Paying for productivity: a look at the evidence
Will higher pay provide an incentive for better work? Can productivity be increased by changing the way workers are compensated? In response to the urgent need to improve productivity performance in American industry, leading economists examine alternative compensation schemes to assess their efficiency in raising productivity.Over the years a number of suggestions have been made for improving labor productivity by changing the manner in which laborers are compensated for their efforts. The ideas presented and analyzed in this volume have all been put into practice, in modified form or on a small scale, in the United States or elsewhere. Some are new; others quite old.David I. Levine and Laura D'Andrea Tyson consider the effects of employee participation in decisionmaking on firm performance, and Martin L. Weitzman and Douglas L. Kruse discuss the implications of profit sharing and related forms of pay for group performance. Michael A. Conte and Jan Svejnar analyze employee stock ownership plans in the United States and other forms of worker ownership in Europe; Masanore Hashimoto uses a transaction-cost perspective to assess Japanese employment and wage systems. Daniel J. B. Mitchell, David Lewin, and Edward E. Lawler III give an overall analysis of traditional and alternative pay systems, their history, development, and curent use, and recommend further experimentation with alternative compensation plans to ensure more adaptability on the part of U.S. firms. Blinder provides an overview of the findings and conclusions.
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Alternative Pay Systems Firm Performance and Productivity
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alternative pay systems American analysis benefits bonuses coefficients companies compensation contract cooperatives corporate David Lewin decisionmaking dummy econometric effect of profit efficiency empirical employee ownership employee participation employee stock ownership ESOP estimated Estrin evidence example firm-specific human capital firm's FitzRoy flexibility free rider problem gain sharing gain-sharing plans George Strauss growth Hanami Hashimoto Hewlett-Packard human capital human resource incentive plans increase industrial relations instrumental variables investment Japan Japanese Japanese firms Jones Journal Kazuo Koike Keith Bradley Labor Relations labor-management literature long-term employment measures monitoring motivate Munni organization organizational output participatory firms percent personnel policies problem production workers productiv productivity effects profit sharing profit-sharing plans quality circles Raisian regressions reported Review sample Scanlon Plan significant statistically Stock Ownership Plans studies suggests survey theory transaction costs United variables wage worker ownership worker participation workplace