Perception: A Representative Theory
What is the nature of, and what is the relationship between, external objects and our visual perceptual experience of them? In this book, Frank Jackson defends the answers provided by the traditional Representative theory of perception. He argues, among other things that we are never immediately aware of external objects, that they are the causes of our perceptual experiences and that they have only the primary qualities. In the course of the argument, sense data and the distinction between mediate and immediate perception receive detailed defences and the author criticises attempts to reduce perceiving the believing and to show that the Representative theory makes the external world unknowable. Jackson recognises that his views are unfashionable but argues in detail that they are to be preferred to their currently favoured competitors. It will become an obvious point of reference for all future work on the philosophy of perception.
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Three uses of looks
The existence of mental objects
The case for sensedata
Colour and science
The objections to representationalism
Seeing things and seeing that
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adverbial theory analysed in terms analysis applied argue argument arguments from illusion Armstrong bodily sensations causal cause chapter claim coach coloured expanse D. M. Armstrong Direct Realism direct realist distinction entails epistemic Ethiopian artefact example existence external objects fact foot G. E. Moore George Blake ground H. P. Grice hallucinations Hence hypothesis immediate object immediately perceive inclination to believe inference J. J. C. Smart kind Likewise logical looks F looks red material object material things matter means mental objects MRTA normal object of perception obvious pain person phantom limb philosophical phosphene physical objects possible predicates problem proposition question reason red after-image red in front red patch red shape red things relation relevant Representationalism representationalist Representative theory scientific property Scientific Realism seeing-that semantic sense-data sensory item sentence statements suggestion suppose theorist things look tion tomato true visual perception wall