Perceptual Knowledge

Front Cover
Springer Science & Business Media, Oct 31, 1980 - Philosophy - 226 pages
0 Reviews
This book grew out of the lectures that I prepared for my students in epis temology at SUNY College at Brockport beginning in 1974. The conception of the problem of perception and the interpretation of the sense-datum theory and its supporting arguments that are developed in Chapters One through Four originated in these lectures. The rest of the manuscript was first written during the 1975-1976 academic year, while I held an NEH Fellowship in Residence for College Teachers at Brown University, and during the ensuing summer, under a SUNY Faculty Research Fellowship. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the National Endowment for the Humanities and to the Research Foundation of the State University of New York for their support of my research. I am grateful to many former students, colleagues, and friends for their stimulating, constructive comments and criticisms. Among the former stu dents whose reactions and objections were most helpful are Richard Motroni, Donald Callen, Hilary Porter, and Glenn Shaikun. Among my colleagues at Brockport, I wish to thank Kevin Donaghy and Jack Glickman for their comments and encouragement. I am indebted to Eli Hirsch for reading and commenting most helpfully on the entire manuscript, to Peter M. Brown for a useful correspondence concerning key arguments in Chapters Five and Seven, to Keith Lehrer for a criticism of one of my arguments that led me to make some important revisions, and to Roderick M.
 

What people are saying - Write a review

We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.

Contents

A PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM CONCERNING PERCEPTION AND KNOWLEDGE
11
1 WHY PERCEPTION DOES NOT AMOUNT TO KNOWLEDGE
12
2 DOES PERCEPTION UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS OF OBSERVATION AMOUNT TO KNOWLEDGE
14
3 THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE CONDITIONS BE KNOWN TO BE NORMAL
20
THE SENSEDATUM THEORY
26
THE ARGUMENT FROM PERCEPTUAL RELATIVITY
30
2 EVALUATION OF THE ARGUMENT
35
THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION
47
4 THE JUSTIFICATION THESIS I
95
5 THE JUSTIFICATION THESIS II
110
PHENOMENALISM
123
ITS PARADOXES
129
3 THE LINGUISTIC VERSION OF THE SENSEDATUM THEORY AND ANALYTICAL PHENOMENALISM
143
PHENOMENALISM AND THE CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION A COMBINED THEORY
156
2 THE ADVERBIAL THEORY OF APPEARING
158
3 A COMBINED THEORY
167

2 AN EPISTEMOLOG1CAL VERSION OF THE ARGUMENT
52
A CRUCIAL DISTINCTION
59
THE ARGUMENT FROM HALLUCINATION
67
1 ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENT FROM HALLUCINATION
68
2 A REFORMULATION OF THE ARGUMENT
74
THE CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION
77
2 THE ANALYTIC THESIS
80
3 DOES THE CAUSAL THEORY IMPLY THAT PHYSICAL OBJECTS ARE UNPERCEIVABLE?
88
4 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PHENOMENALISM AND CRITICAL COGNITIVISM
179
THE ENTAILMENT OF APPEARSTATEMENTS BY THINGSTATEMENTS
183
THE ENTAILMENT OF THINGSTATEMENTS BY APPEARSTATEMENTS
193
BIBLIOGRAPHY
216
INDEX OF NAMES
220
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
222
Copyright

Other editions - View all

Common terms and phrases

References to this book

All Book Search results »

About the author (1980)

Georges Dicker is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Philosophic Exchange at SUNY Brockport. He is the author of Dewey's Theory of Knowing (1976), Perceptual Knowledge: An Analytical and Historical Study (1980), Descartes: An Analytical and Historical Introduction (1993), Hume's
Epistemology and Metaphysics: An Introduction (1998), and numerous journal articles.

Bibliographic information