Personal Existence After Death: Reductionist Circularities and the Evidence
Addressing the question of the individual's fate at death, this work provides a critique of the reductionist case against post-mortem personhood. Claims of near-death and out-of-body experiences are considered, as are proposals that offer artificial intelligence as a model of human consciousness.
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The Argument from Concept Formation
The Argument from Memory
The Argument from Consciousness
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absence algorithm appears argued argument assertion behavior behavior modification bodily body brain tissue causal cause cells certainty Churchland claim cognitive comatose concept conclusion consciousness corruption cortex death denial deny electrical electrical charge empirical empiricist evidence explain feature Godel's theorem hippocampus human existence human immortality human thought identical immaterial impossible impulses incorruptible indestructible individual interaction Kenneth Ring knowledge known language ability long-term memory magnitudes malevolent material existent materialist hypothesis matter means memory's mental mind molecular near-death experience neural activity neural event neuro-electric neurological neuronal neurophysiological non-bodily non-material notion object occur out-of-body out-of-body experience percept personhood physical prehended premisses present Property dualism proven reasoning reincarnation requires result RNA change Sabom sciousness selfhood sensation sense sense-data sense-faculties sense-objects sensory singular Steven Rose stimulus suggestion synaptic synthesis Telepathy tenth planet thesis tightwire tion truth visual percept Wilder Penfield