Physical Realism: Being an Analytical Philosophy from the Physical Objects of Science to the Physical Data of SenseLongmans, Green, and Company, 1888 - Всего страниц: 387 |
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admitted æther analogy analytical judgments apprehend Aristotle association of ideas axiom Berkeley Berkeley's body colour conception conclusion confusion consciousness corpuscles data of sense deduction Descartes distance distinct efferent nerves Essay evidence existence experience extended external object external world facts false Hence Hume Hume's hypothesis idealistic ideas or sensations immediate imperceptible impressions induction infer insensible intuitive realism Kant known laws Leibnitz Locke Locke's logical matter mental philosophy mind motion natural philosophy nerves nervous system object of sense objects of knowledge objects of science operation optic optic nerve particles particular particular judgment perceive perception phænomena physical objects physical realism posteriori premises primary qualities principles produce prove psychical data psychical sensation psychological idealism reality reasoning relations retina says scientific secondary qualities Secondly self-evident sensible data sensible effect sensible heat sensible ideas sensible object similar soul substance supposed syllogism synthetic sense tangible thinking subject thought tion truth whole
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Стр. 146 - Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself.
Стр. 195 - The table I write on I say exists, that is I see and feel it, and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.
Стр. 187 - IT is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination — either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.
Стр. 199 - ... colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of anything existing without the mind or unperceived; but they will have our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call matter. By matter therefore we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist.
Стр. 290 - What, then, is the conclusion of the whole matter? A simple one, though, it must be confessed, pretty remote from the common theories of philosophy. All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object present to the memory or senses and a customary conjunction between that and some other object...
Стр. 311 - But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception...
Стр. 199 - Some there are who make a distinction betwixt primary and secondary qualities.* By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote all other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth.
Стр. 206 - The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called real things : and those excited in the Imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed ideas, or images of things, which they copy and represent.
Стр. 167 - In this case then, when the mind cannot so bring its ideas together, as by their immediate comparison, and as it were juxta-position or application one to another, to perceive their agreement or disagreement, it is fain, by the intervention of other ideas (one or more, as it happens) to discover the agreement or disagreement which it searches; and this is that which we call reasoning.
Стр. 200 - By matter therefore we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist. But it is evident from what we have already shown, that extension, figure and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence it is plain that the very notion of what is called matter or corporeal substance involves...