Preferences, institutions, and rational choice
Rational choice theory has gained considerable influence in politics and sociology over the past thirty years; the use of rational choice methods has proliferated in all areas of social inquiry. From the early days of formal proofs and unrealistic assumptions, rational choice is increasingly being used to model authentic situations and institutions. The collection of essays from leading British writers in the rational choice paradigm concentrates upon the two key aspects of rational choice: the role of preferences and institutions.
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analysis argue argument assume assumption balance of power balance-of-power model behaviour British CalPERS Cambridge University Press capital causal cent Chicken game choi choose claim claimants co-operation co-ordination coalition theory Collective Action companies consdem consensus democracy Corn Laws costs decision decision-making Democracy democratic economic election electoral equation equilibrium example exogenously set expressive expected explanation factors firms free-riding game theory German banks Gladstone Gladstone's growth Guttman scales ideold2 ideological important individual industry institutional instrumental benefits interests interlinked internal balance investment investors Journal of Political liberal democracies London majority Oligopoly Olson's outcomes paradox of voting participation party competition pay-off Peelites Political Economy Political Science preferences problem programmes proxy Public Choice rational choice rational-choice regulation result revolutionary Shapley-Shubik power index significant situation social strategy stress structure Table tion trade undeserving unemployed unemployment utility variables voters voting welfare work-welfare workfare