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The Promise of Game Theory
1 Payoffs for Sherlock Holmes
Critical Problems in the Theory of Games
22 other sections not shown
action game agreement alternative Appendix assumed assumptions Avranches bargaining problem basic behavior cells Chapter Charlene and Ralph choice dominance classical decision theory concessions conﬂict point consider crisis Cuban missile crisis described difﬁcult discussion E:ALL evaluations Everyman example exercises Experiment ﬁnal ﬁnd ﬁrst ﬁt Flgure GAME GAME GAME game theory GAME TYPE 11 German Holmes identiﬁed inﬂuence interests interpersonal comparisons joint outcome Kluge mathematical minimax theorem mixed strategies mixed-motive games Moriarty MULTIPLE WEAK EQUILIBRIA Nash solution natural outcome negotiations neutral no-conﬂict games one’s options pairs of subjects Pareto Pareto-deﬁcient Pareto-optimal frontier particular pattern possible outcomes predict preference presented primitive games prisoner’s dilemma probability prospect theory pure conﬂict game Quemoy rank order rank-order reﬂect represent representation Schellenberg shown in Figure side payments SINGLE STRONG EQUILIBRIUM SINGLE WEAK EQUILIBRIUM situation social solution concepts strategy STRONG EQUILIBRIUM GAME suggest summary theory of games TYPE 42 WEAK EQUILIBRIA GAME