## Primitive Games |

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### Contents

The Promise of Game Theory | 3 |

Critical Problems in the Theory of Games | 17 |

A Primitive Alternative | 33 |

Copyright | |

23 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

2x2 primitive games action game actor model agreement alternative Antwerp Appendix assumed assumptions Avranches bargaining problem behavior Berlin Crisis bilateral monopoly ceasefire cells Chapter Charlene Chester chicken game choice dominance classical decision theory Clyde Coombs companion matrix concave function conflict point consider convex function crisis Cuban missile crisis Daniel Ellsberg decision makers described dilemma-type direct linear transformation discussion dominant strategy Dutch E:ALL East Germany equity theory evaluations Everyman example exercises Experiment Felsenthal Figure Formosa Strait game of chicken game theory GAME TYPE 44 games Games games without German Holmes Howard Raiffa However identified indeterminacy problem interests interpersonal comparisons J. D. Williams Jack and Jill Jericho road John Harsanyi John von Neumann joint outcome Kahneman married couple mathematical matrix might minimax minimax theorem mixed strategies mixed-motive games Moriarty MULTIPLE WEAK EQUILIBRIA Nash natural outcome negative negotiations Neumann and Morgenstern neutral neutral level Nigel Howard no-conflict games non-zero-sum games options Oskar Morgenstern pairs of subjects Pareto Pareto-deficient Pareto-optimal frontier particular parties pattern players positive possible outcomes postdictive predict preference presented prisoner's dilemma probability probability axioms Professor Moriarty prospect theory pure conflict game pure indifference Quemoy Ralph rank order rank-order represent representation representative realism saddle point Schellenberg send-the-marines senior prom Sherlock Holmes side payments SINGLE STRONG EQUILIBRIUM SINGLE WEAK EQUILIBRIUM situation social social exchange theory social psychology social science solution concepts solution point Southland Soviet Union strategy STRONG EQUILIBRIUM GAME structures subjectively expected utility suggest theory of games Tversky two-person zero-sum games TYPE 22 utility utility model utility theory von Kluge von Neumann WEAK EQUILIBRIA GAME West Berlin without a natural zero-sum Zeuthen