Property rights and incomplete contracts: dealing with nuisance
Rohan Pitchford, Christopher M. Snyder, Australian National University. Faculty of Economics and Commerce, Australian National University. Research School of Social Sciences
Faculty of Economics & Commerce and Economics Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1996 - 43 pages
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
allocating property rights allocation of property assume assumption B's payoff bargaining game choose iA Coase Theorem Consider the subgame constitute a subgame continuation payoff given court derived doctrine efficient outcome equilibrium outcome ex-ante example expropriate extensive-form game feedlot Flavio Menezes flow payments giving property rights granting property rights GT(C hold-up problem identity implying incomplete contracts indicator function inefficient location intuition involves John Quiggin joint surplus location choice location decision locational investment max(aA move Nash bargaining solution Nash equilibrium Nature chooses negative externality negotiation nuisance obtain offer rules optimal paper parties locate party chooses party property rights players potential second prime area PROOF Proposition real-estate developer satisfied second mover second party property Section sgn(WB Simon Grant social optimum solution concept specific standard Nash bargaining Subgame GT subgame perfect equilibrium Suppose taking limits two-stage Nash bargaining variables Webb yields