Property rights, incomplete contracts, and social harm
Rohan Pitchford, Christopher M. Snyder, Australian National University. Faculty of Economics and Commerce, Australian National University. Research School of Social Sciences. Economics Program
Faculty of Economics & Commerce, and Economics Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1999 - Business & Economics - 39 pages
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