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Property Rules vs Untailored Liability Rules
Applications Limitations and Conclusions
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adverse selection analysis Appendix infra autarky bargaining procedure bilateral monopoly cheap talk Coase Theorem Coasean transaction compulsory licensing consensual countervailing incentives court Cramton credible damages amount defendant type defendant's ECON equilibrium ex post efficiency exist an incentive Gilson Grundfest Ian Ayres identical individually rational bargaining induce efficient bargaining inefficient information rents intellectual property interim efficiency interval Law and Economics legal entitlement legal rule Lemma liability amount litigation costs Mark Kelman mechanism design mechanism p,x Mitchell Polinsky monotone nonincreasing Myerson & Satterthwaite negotiate nondecreasing optimal bargaining mechanism outcome pA(vA participation constraints parties patent law plaintiff type player types Polinsky and Steven potential private information Program Proof property right property rules i.e. Proposition reservation payoff reservation utility Ronald Satterthwaite 1983 Section seller shadow Shavell signal Signalling Games Stanford Law School tailored damages trade transaction costs types of Coasean untailored liability rule v„vA valuing defendant worst off plaintiff