Prospects for a New United States-Japan Semiconductor Agreement: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, First Session, March 20, 1991, Volume 4

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Page 9 - Japanese government agreed to eliminate these formal restrictions, it was also developing a series of "liberalization countermeasures" to offset the impact of liberalization. These countermeasures included subsidies, government sponsorship of joint R&D projects, continued administrative guidance to buy Japanese, the creation of horizontal links between Japanese producers, an organized division of product markets, and encouragement of tight relationships between Japanese producers and consumers of...
Page 6 - Department's testimony before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Page 8 - Win with the 10 % rule . . . Find AMD and Intel sockets . . . Quote 10% below their price . . . If they requote, . . . Go 10% again Don't quit till you win . . 25% DISTI profits margin Guaranteed.
Page 10 - They could achieve sales in Japan with a given device as long as sufficient quantities of a competing Japanese product were not available.
Page 10 - US firms' sales fell dramatically, sometimes to zero. Given the buy-Japan policies and the increasing ability of Japanese companies to replicate foreign chips, the US share began declining in 1980 and, in 1982, was lower than the US share in 1974, the last year the market was protected by quotas. High Technology Working Group...
Page 2 - ... markets might be easiest to crack, low-interest loans to exporters from the government-dominated banking system, and the lowest corporate taxes in the industrial world. Most of all, American are incensed by the way that Japan, while invading foreign markets, has closed its domestic economy to many foreign goods and most foreign capital investment. Supposedly, that situation is changing. In 1969, Tokyo maintained quotas or other barriers against 120 categories of imports. Last January, the number...
Page 2 - I have been a salesman for 20 years," he says, "and I know that whatever a salesman's customers do not want to buy, he starts blaming someone else." In fact, the US reaction reflects more than pain in the pocketbook. American executives are enraged by what they regard as Japan's refusal to observe the rules of the game of world trade. Many American businessmen contend, with some justification, that the Jaapnese dump not only TV sets but also steel, textiles, float glass and radio tuners. US industrialists...
Page 2 - ... cartels formed to win big foreign orders, lavish and extensive government-financed studies of which overseas markets might be easiest to crack, low-interest loans to exporters from the government-dominated banking system, and the lowest corporate taxes in the industrial world. Most of all, American are incensed by the way that Japan, while invading foreign markets, has closed its domestic economy to many foreign goods and most foreign capital investment. Supposedly, that situation is changing....
Page 29 - I am very pleased to be here and I thank you for the invitation to talk about a subject of this nature. I have a sub-title which is "To What End?".
Page 11 - Japanese companies to sell at a loss abroad. Japanese companies, sheltered from risk in their home market — the world's largest — by anticompetitive practices and financed by the deep pockets of their affiliated and parent companies, engaged in tremendous capacity expansion races that resulted in the sale of semiconductors at prices far below the cost of production during the mid-1980s. The Arrangement was intended to instill competition and market forces in Japan — in other words, to break...