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abstract accidental acts according action activity affirmation Anaxagoras animal Anthropology Aristotle attention belongs body called cause ciple cognition colour conation conceived concept consequence considered constitutes continuous corporeal determined distinguish duration entity essence essential excited exist explain extended extensive quantity external extra-subjective fact faculty foreign force fundamental feeling harmony Hence human idea ideal identical immanent act inasmuch individual infinite instinct intel intellective intelligence intuition law of thought limited matter means merely mind mode moral motion move movement nature object observe ontological operation Parmenides passive perceived perception philosophers Plato practical reason produce Protagoras rational principle reality reflection relation remains retina seen sensation sense sensible sensiferous sensions sensitive principle sensitive soul sensory sentient principle simple space speak species spirit spontaneity subsistence substance Theodicy things Thomas says thought tion transient acts true truth unity vibrations whereby words Xenophanes
Page 68 - DICENDUM quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium: comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est : unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum: sed magis sicut receptum ad recipiens. Cum enim dico esse hominis. vel equi, vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut formale et receptum : non autem ut illud cui competit esse.
Page 436 - Visus enim videt colorem pomi sine ejus odore. Si ergo quaeratur ubi sit color qui videtur sine odore, manifestum est quod color qui videtur non est nisi in pomo. Sed quod sit sine odore perceptus, hoc accidit ei ex parte visus, in quantum in visu est similitudo coloris et non odoris.
Page 208 - What is the nature of the soul ? " this was permissible, because in previous works we had analysed in detail all the acts and faculties that can be observed in the soul. And we analysed all these with that kind of analysis which belongs to spirit alone, an analysis which does not cut it up into several parts, but considers the single parts without rending them from their one root in which they live and move and have their being, and which is the substance of the soul itself. 1119. Now, after having...
Page 43 - ... was what was being sought for. ARTICLE II. Some Philosophers, using the second mode of abstraction (hypothetic abstraction) made matter an immaterial being. 8 1 1. Now, if, as we have seen, we remove from the concept of matter all thought of extension in general, this concept no longer expresses anything. We are then considering force by means of hypothetic, and no longer by means of thetic, abstraction. Hence even St. Thomas teaches, that, if we abstract from all extension, we thereby abstract...
Page 445 - If thou see the ass of him that hateth thei; lie underneath his burden, thou shalt not pass by, but shalt lift him up with him.
Page 368 - TE&vsa/Tor) ; t which seems to mean that men, dissolving into their principles, become Gods, and so form the life of the Gods, who are principles, and, becoming men, and acquiring human life, live the death of the Gods because they cease to be principles. The other is : " You cannot step twice into the same river. For, as you are stepping in, other and yet other waters flow on ; we step in and do not step in ; yea, -we are and are not" (YloTaiji-^ai on Toiffiv ai?TOiViv oux ay E/x/3air,r eTEpO.
Page 152 - ... soul), so the same being, in its essential character of good, creates the primitive will, as the final cause which actuates the first affection, the first volition, directed to universal being. And as the intellect is the receptive power, so the will is the active power which corresponds to it. 1009. Now, since the intellect has, as its essential object, ideal being, which is in itself immutable, it is not susceptible of any development, and has the nature of an immanent act rather than of a...
Page 42 - Intellectus igitur abstrahit speciem rei naturalis a materia sensibili individuali, non autem a materia sensibili communi. Sicut speciem hominis abstrahit ab his carnibus et his ossibus, quae non sunt de ratione speciei, sed sunt partes individui, ut dicitur in VII Metaphys. ; et ideo sine eis considerari potest. Sed species hominis non potest abstrahi per intellectum a carnibus et ossibus.