Questions of Judgment: Determining What's Right
Questions of Judgment: Determining What's Right opens a new window on knowledge by examining judgment as exercise, an aspect that has received little notice since Aristotle. To label a contentious issue "a question of judgment" is widely regarded as a cognitive put-down that relegates judgment to the realm of the subjective. Challenging this view, F. H. Low-Beer begins by collecting what little has been said about the subject, and uncovers diverse meanings attributed to judgment generally. Identifying the critical elements of the exercise of judgment and relating them to cognitive functions, he argues for an autonomous status for judgment not traditionally acknowledged. Accepting its central place in cognition and everyday practice leads him to look at the extent to which judgment can be learned and its reciprocal relationship to character. Problems usually dealt with under the headings of practical reasoning, decision theory, and interpretation are examined in this new light. But apart from new theoretical insights, a singular contribution of Questions of Judgment lies in its examination of the overlooked place of judgment in everyday practice.
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action answer appears application Aristotle aspects attribute belief causal central choice cognition common sense concept of judgment considerations constitute context court credibility critical Davidson decision theory define depends determine Dewey discussion distinction Douglas Hofstadter elements emphasis Ethics example exercise of judgment exercising judgment fact faculty fallibility Frege fuzzy logic Gadamer Gilbert Harman human ideal ideas importance and appropriateness ingredients intelligence interpretation intuition issue Jerry Fodor John Searle judg judgmental function judgmental process Kant knowledge language lawyer logical meaning ment mental events metaphor mind moral objectivity particular perhaps person Peter Lynch philosophers political position practical reasoning prediction principle professional proposition propositional attitude psychology question rationality recognition recognize reference relevant result role Ronald Dworkin rule simply social sort Stanley Cavell structure things thought tion truth values Wall Street Journal weight Wittgenstein