Rational Behaviour and the Design of Institutions: Concepts, Theories and Models
The structures of the world's national and international political and economic institutions have largely resulted from intuitive and ad-hoc organizations with reforms taking place on trial-and-error bases. This work evaluates tools which can be used for a more rational and formal approach.
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agenda Allais paradox assume assumption average payoff axioms backwards induction Banzhaf index Borda count Brams choice behaviour chosen collective Column condition Condorcet paradox Condorcet winner criterion Consider cooperation procedure cooperative core Council decision maker decision rule decision theory defined definition denoted discussed dominant strategy example exists extensive-form game Further reading game theory given ideal point implementation indices individual institutional design intuitive issue latter Maskin monotonicity maximization mixed strategy n-person n-tuple Nash equilibrium node norms pair paradox Pareto payoff matrix plurality Power Index Values preference profile preference relation principle probability problem proposal prospect theory rational behaviour resort risky prospects Row's satisfy simple majority rule situation social choice social choice theory solution concepts sophisticated voting subgame subgame-perfect subset supergame Table theorem tion Tsebelis utility function voters voting games voting outcomes voting power voting systems winning coalitions