Rational Intuition: Philosophical Roots, Scientific InvestigationsWhat is intuition? What constitutes an intuitive process? Why are intuition concepts important? After many years of scholarly neglect, interest in intuition is now exploding in psychology and cognitive science. Moreover, intuition is also enjoying a renaissance in philosophy. Yet no single definition of intuition appears in contemporary scholarship; there is no consensus on the meaning of this concept in any discipline. Rational Intuition focuses on conceptions of intuition in relation to rational processes. Covering a broad range of historical and contemporary contexts, prominent philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists explore how intuition is implicated in rational activity in its diverse forms. In bringing the philosophical history of intuition into novel dialogue with contemporary philosophical and empirical research, Lisa M. Osbeck and Barbara S. Held invite a comparison of the conceptions and functions of intuition, thereby clarifying and advancing conceptual analysis across disciplines. |
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Contents
Intuition in Aristotle | 39 |
Intuition and Knowledge | 55 |
Descartes on Intuition and Ideas | 75 |
Spinozas Conception of Intuition | 90 |
Intuition and the Synthetic A Priori | 114 |
Husserls Phenomenological Theory of Intuition | 131 |
Getting Back into Duration | 151 |
Intuition in Mathematics | 174 |
Intuition in Strategic Thinking | 239 |
Intuition in Kahneman and Tverskys Psychology of Rationality | 257 |
How Eureka Results from Three Neural | 287 |
Cognitive and Neural Mechanisms That | 307 |
Intuition in 21stCentury Moral Psychology | 338 |
Syntax and Semantics | 362 |
farzad mahootian Global Liberal Studies New York University | 386 |
An Interplay of Psychological | 395 |
Other editions - View all
Rational Intuition: Philosophical Roots, Scientific Investigations Lisa M. Osbeck,Barbara S. Held No preview available - 2016 |
Common terms and phrases
abstract activity analysis argued argument Aristotle Aristotle’s behavior Bergson biases body brain Cambridge University Press Cantor Set causal Chomsky claim cognitive science Cokely conatus concept of intuition conjunction fallacy consciousness creative decision Descartes Devitt duration Egon Brunswik emotions empirical empiricism endoxa entities epistemic epistemology essence evidence example experimental expert intuition explain external externalist Feltz function Gigerenzer grasp Haidt heuristics human Husserl idea implicit learning intellectual intuitive act intuitive judgments Journal Jung Kahneman and Tversky Kant Kant’s knowledge language linguistic logic mathematical intuition meaning mechanisms mental metaphysics method mind moral movement nature neo-Platonic neural neurons object Ockham one’s Oxford University Press perception perceptual experience phenomenological philosophical Posterior Analytics principles problem proposition psychology reason reference relation reliabilism representations role rules scientific semantic pointers sense sensory social Spinoza’s tacit knowledge Thagard theory thinking thought thought experiments tion truth unconscious understanding Whitehead York