Rationality in Social Interactions

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Logos Verlag Berlin GmbH, 2009 - Business & Economics - 130 pages
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The analysis of human decision making in social sciences is often based on a conception of rationality. This dissertation contains three microeconomic models, which directly build on the rationality assumption in economic theory. We model agents endowed with rational preferences and analyze how such preferences translate into decisions in a given social interaction. In particular, we present three different models: (1) Arrovian social choice theory with delegation as a feasible policy alternative; (2) Game theory and the existence of mental equilibrium in 2x2 games; (3) Information economics and its application to analyzing stakeholder participation in electronic health record networks.
 

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Contents

Introduction
1
NonDictatorial Social Choice through Delegation
13
Existence of Mental Equilibrium in 22 Games
37
An Economics Perspective
73
References
115
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