Rationality in Social Interactions
The analysis of human decision making in social sciences is often based on a conception of rationality. This dissertation contains three microeconomic models, which directly build on the rationality assumption in economic theory. We model agents endowed with rational preferences and analyze how such preferences translate into decisions in a given social interaction. In particular, we present three different models: (1) Arrovian social choice theory with delegation as a feasible policy alternative; (2) Game theory and the existence of mental equilibrium in 2x2 games; (3) Information economics and its application to analyzing stakeholder participation in electronic health record networks.
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Al Jazirah approach Arrovian conditions Arrow’s assume assumptions beneﬁts chapter conﬂict consider decision deﬁned Deﬁnition denote dominant strategy EHR networks electronic health record emotions equilibrium concept ﬁnite ﬁrst Furthermore game theoretic global pairs health type Hence HIV type HIV+ homo economicus incentives individual preferences inequality aversion inﬂuence information economic instance insurance companies intrinsic privacy Lemma material game material payoff maxmin value medical data networks medical database medical information mental equilibrium mental game mixed IDC strategy mixed strategy ℳl monetary motives Nash equilibrium outcome function pair of alternatives Pareto principle particular patient behavior player i’s preference proﬁle prisoner’s dilemma proof proposed public beliefs pure strategy rationality relevant satisﬁes Section signiﬁcant signiﬁcantly simple alternatives social choice social choice theory social preference ordering social welfare social welfare function society speciﬁc stakeholders strategy proﬁle subsets sufﬁcient theory typically ultimatum game utility function whereas Winter