Readings on Color: The philosophy of color, Volume 1
Alex Byrne, David R. Hilbert
MIT Press, 1997 - Philosophy - 317 pages
"This admirable volume of readings is the first of a pair: the editors are to be applauded for placing the philosophy of color exactly where it should go, in double harness with the most recent discoveries in the science of color and color vision. Byrne and Hilbert concentrate on the main game, the question of realism, choose well, and bring the collection right up to date with two new essays quite as good as anything else in the volume."
-- Keith Campbell, Challis Professor of Philosophy, University of Sydney Color is an endlessly fascinating subject to philosophers, scientists, and laypersons, as well an an instructive microcosm of cognitive science. In these two anthologies, Alex Byrne and David Hilbert present a survey of the important recent philosophical and scientific writings on color. The introduction to volume 1 provides a philosophical background and links the philosophical issues to the empirical work covered in volume 2. The bibliography in volume 1 is an extensive resource for those doing philosophical work on color. The scientific selections in volume 2 present work in color science that is relevant to philosophical thinking about color; the material is comprehensive and sophisticated enough to be useful to the scientific reader. The introduction to volume 2 is an overview of color science; the volume also contains suggestions for further reading.
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a-all account account of color after-image anthropocentric appear argue argument Armstrong beliefs blue Boghossian canary yellow causal cause chapter characterization claim color content color experience color properties color sensations D. M. Armstrong disjunctive dispositionalist distinction eliminativism ence example experience represents explanation fact fregean identify instantiated intrinsic introspective intuition inverted spectrum J. J. C. Smart kind look red mental metamerism microphysical properties nature nondisjunctive normal human normal observers one's orange Oxford particular perceivers perception phenomenal character phenomenology Philosophical physical properties physicalist possible present Primary Quality account problem projectivism property red qualia question red objects red-feeling experience reflect relation relevant representational content reveal rience russellian secondary qualities seems seen sense shade of yellow Shoemaker similar simply someone sort spectral standard standardly supervenient suppose surface Sydney Shoemaker theory things tion tomato veridical viewing conditions vision visual experience visual field visual perception wavelength